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The Case Against Gender-Based 
Peremptory Challenges 
by David Everett Marko· 
Since the inception of the jury system in the United States, attorneys 
have insisted that they be given the freedom to make "shoot-from-the-
hip," "seat-of-the-pants," and "gut-level" judgments about a particular 
juror's capacity to sit as a fair trier of fact. Unfortunately, this broad 
discretion has led to widespread abuses. Until relatively recently, courts 
have allowed potential jurors to be excluded on the basis of their race, 
religion, political affiliation, national origin, and gender. With the excep-
tion of gender-based peremptions, all these abuses have been judicially 
corrected without compromising the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
If the state's right to exercise gender-based peremptory challenges was 
ever justified (and I doubt that it ever was), that time is surely past. The 
use of this type of challenge has been so grossly abused and has strayed 
so far from notions of common justice and equality that is time to con-
strain it. "Seat-of-the-pants" and similar justifications for gender-based 
strikes are no more than euphemisms for jury manipulation and gender 
discrimination. Courts should no longer tolerate the use of peremptory 
challenges to perpetuate chauvinist myths about the "basic nature of men 
and women." It is time to return the peremptory challenge to its intended 
role as a tool for ferreting out specific juror bias and eliminate its perpet-
uation of wholesale gender bias. 
• J.D., Florida State University, 1991; L.L.M., Free University of Brussels, 1992; 
currently practicing law with Starkman & Magolmick in Miami, Florida. I thank the 
First Amendment for making it possible to question everything with impunity. I thank 
William Paul Huey for his editorial expertise. This article would never have been 
written without his great skill and effort. Furthermore, I thank Miquel de la 0, 
Eduardo Cruz, Ferman Fernandez, and Dan Sikes for their ideas, insight, and humor. 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 109 
110 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 
THE ORIGIN AND USE OF THE MODERN·· 
CRIMINAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
[Vol. 4:1 
The goal of voir dire in a criminal trial is to choose jurors who can 
sit fairly and apply the facts as they see them to the law as it is ex-
plained to them. 1 In selecting a jury, both sides are given certain devices 
. to challenge lK1tentiaJ jurors and exetffiJe them=t'rom: deciding the case. 
One such device employed to eliminate "unwanted" jurors is the pe-
remptory challenge.2 
The peremptory challenge has ancient origins. Prior to the fourteenth 
century, English juries were chosen by the government. The Crown could 
eliminate anyone from jury service without showing cause.3 Even though 
this unlimited power was revoked by statute,4 the government retained 
the right to request the removal of any potential juror as long as there 
were other potential jurors remaining in the venire. The Crown was re-
quired to show cause for its challenges only after the panel was exhaust-
ed. Although there was no limit to the number of potential jurors the 
government could make "stand aside," the defendant was limited in the 
number of challenges he or she could raise and could exercise his or her 
challenges only as each juror was called.s 
Colonial concerns about the power of government prompted Ameri-
cans to deviate from the English system.6 Emphasis shifted towards the 
interests of those accused. Originally, some states gave few or no pe-
remptory challenges to the government;7 but as fear of a tyrannical gov-
1. Mark Twain is rumored to have said, "[ w]e have a jury system that is superior 
to any in the world, and its efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding 
twelve men everyday who don't know anything .... " Albert W. Alschu1er, The 
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Reviews of 
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. em. L. REv. 153, 154 (1989). 
2. A peremptory challenge results in the exclusion of a juror without cause, with-
out explanation, and without judicial scrutiny. Robert Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202, 211-12 (1965). The other type of challenge is the "challenge for cause." This 
challenge is exercised solely at the discretion of the trial court. Typically, challenges 
for cause are granted because a potential juror has a pecuniary interest in the disposi-
tion of the case, is biased, or is a blood relation to a party in the case. See Tori M. 
Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, 
and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 519 n.103 (1986). Challenges for cause are 
not covered in this article. 
3. JON M. V AN DYKE, JURY SELECfION PROCEDURES 148 (1977); Massaro, supra 
note 2, at 525 (before 1305 A.D. the government had an unlimited number of pe-
remptory challenges). 
4. Until the statute of 33 Edward 1, the Crown could challenge any juror without 
cause. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483 (1827). 
5. Massaro, supra note 2, at 525. 
6. Id. at 525-26. 
7. For example, New York and Virginia gave no peremptory challenges to the 
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ernment subsided, the government's right to peremptory challenges be-
came standard practice.8 
The peremptory challenge, however, is not a right under the Constitu-
tion;9 it is a creature spawned by the rules of criminal procedure. 1O Un-
der these rules, the prosecution and the defense have the right to exercise 
each of their peremptory challenges against any potential juror they 
chooseY Jury selection is complete only after each side either exhausts 
its peremptory challenges or chooses not to exercise its remaining chal-
lenges. 12 
''The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one 
exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being 
subject to the court's control.,,13 Each side is free to strike whomever it 
chooses. Problems arise when attorneys exercise their peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of their group status. 
One group that has been particularly affected is women. 14 A recent fed-
government until 1881 and 1919, respectively. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 149. 
8. [d. at 150. 
9. Swain, 380 u.s. at 219 (quoting Joseph Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 
586 (1919): "There is nothing in the Constitution ... which requires ... peremptory 
challenges"). See also McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). The Court has, however, often recognized the key 
role peremptories play in our criminal justice system. In Swain, the Court explained: 
[The peremptory challenge's function is] not only to eliminate ex-
tremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the 
jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the 
evidence placed before them, and not otherwise. In this way the pe-
remptory satisfies the rule that "to perform its high function in the 
best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice .... 
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955». 
10. Nonetheless, it has long been considered one of the "most important of the 
rights secured to the accused." Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting John Pointer v. Unit-
ed States, 151 U.S. 408 (1894». 
11. This does not mean that peremptory challenges are unregulated by the courts. 
While women are not sheltered against misuse of peremptory challenges, other groups 
are protected. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that the Constitution requires 
that peremptory challenges not be used to discriminate on the basis of race. James 
Kirkland Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
12. In the federal system, each side in a capital case is allowed to exercise twenty 
peremptory challenges; in felony cases the defendant(s) gets a total of ten challenges 
and the prosecution gets six; in misdemeanor cases each side gets three. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 24(b). Each state has its own criminal procedure rules, but they are substan-
tially the same as the federal rules. WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND GEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3, at 847 (1984). Typically, each side has the same num-
ber of challenges available to it; however, the number of peremptory challenges varies 
between jurisdictions in cases involving multiple defendants. [d. 
13. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. 
14. At common law only men were allowed to sit as jurors. Women were excluded 
because they were deemed to be inferior. The English doctrine justifying this exclu-
sion was propter defectum sexus (because of the defect of sex). This doctrine express-
7 MPI 
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eral case illustrates this problem. In United States v. Hamilton, IS a de-
fense attorney complained that the prosecutor struck three potential jurors 
because they were African-American, violating the Equal Protection 
Clause contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Ken-
tucky.16 The prosecutor responded that his reason for excluding the pro-
spective jurors was not race but gender - all three were women. He 
claimed that he wanted more men on the jury.17 The trial judge held 
that as long as the reasons for striking the jurors were racially neutral, 
there were no constitutional difficulties. 18 On appeal the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that neither the Equal Protection 
Clause nor the Sixth Amendment protected women from sex-based pe-
remptory challenges. 19 
Hamilton and similar cases illustrate the gender discrimination that 
pervades our judicial system.20 But gender-based peremptory challenges 
clearly have no legitimate purpose in the selection of the petit jury. They 
are fundamentally incompatible not only with contemporary societal val-
ues but also with our basic sense of fairness and equality and our consti-
tutionally guaranteed right to be tried by a jury representing a fair cross-
section of the local community. 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
ly eliminated women from jury service except in cases where pregnancy was at issue. 
See R. Justin Miller, The Woman Juror, 2 OR. L. REv. 30, 31 (1922). American 
women were not completely free to sit on federal juries until 1957, and it was not 
until 1968 that all fifty states seated women jurors. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, 
Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634-38 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of Title 28 and 42 of the United States Code). Mississippi was the last state to re-
voke its statute barring women from jury service. Martha Daughtrey, Cross Sectional-
ism in Jury-Selection Procedures after Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. I, 51-
53 (1975). 
15. 850 F.2d 1038, 1040 (4th Cir. 1988). 
16. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race-based peremptory challenges of black potential jurors 
exercised by the state in the trial of a black defendant violate the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
17. Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1041. 
18. Id. at 1040 
19. Id. at 1043. 
20. See also State v. Thomas Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987); State v. 
Lorie A. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 1989); Belinda C. Hannan v. Commonwealth, 
774 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Salt Lake County v. Linda J. Carlston, 776 
P.2d 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Sandra Adams, 533 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 
Ct. 1988), cert. denied, 540 So. 2d 338 (La. 1989). 
tHil,a nt""'" 
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Our notions of juries have evolved in hannony with the basic premis-
es of a democratic society and a representative government.21 What was 
a common-law privilege yesterday is a recognized right today.22 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent part 
that in "all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.,,23 Although the Sixth 
Amendment does not give a defendant the right to be tried by a petit jury 
of any particular composition, it does comprehend the opportunity of 
"obtaining a jury constituting a representative cross section of the com-
munity.,,24 This "opportunity" has been defined to mean that the jury 
venire must represent a cross-section of the community. 
In Glasser v. United States,2S the Supreme Court held that a jury 
must be a body truly representative of the community from which it is 
drawn. As Justice Murphy noted so eloquently in Fay v. New York: 
We can never measure accurately the prejudice that results from 
the exclusion of certain types of qualified people from a jury 
panel. Such prejudice is so subtle, so intangible, that it escapes 
the ordinary methods of proof .... [I]t may gradually and silent-
ly erode the jury system before it becomes evident . . . . If the 
constitutional right to a jury impartially drawn from a cross-sec-
tion of the community has been violated, we should vindicate that 
right even though the effect of the violation has not yet put in a 
tangible appearance. Otherwise that right may be irretrievably lost 
in a welter of evidentiary rules.26 
Nevertheless, the Court has never held that th~ Constitution requires that 
the petit jury actually reflect a cross-section of the community.27 
21. Daniel D. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942). 
22. Edgar Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). 
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The full text of the amendment reads as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
24. Billy J. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). See also Gilbert E. 
Theil v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (excluding daily wage-earners vio-
lates the fair-cross-section requirement). 
25. 315 U.S. at 86. 
26. 332 U.S. 261, 300 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
27. A.L. Lockhart v. Ardia V. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986), rev'g Claude 
Davis Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 
& 
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Recently, the Supreme Court took the position that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not preclude either side from exercising its peremptory strikes 
against any group. In Holland v. Illinois,28 the Court upheld the convic-
tion of a white defendant who claimed that the Sixth Amendment fair-
cross-section requirement prevented the prosecutor from excluding poten-
tial African-American jurors on the basis of their race. In a five-to-four 
decision the Court explained that "[t]he fair-cross-section venire require-
ment is obviously not explicit in this text [the Sixth Amendment], but is 
derived from the traditional understanding of how an 'impartial jury' is 
assembled.,,29 The Court suggested that the fair-cross-section requirement 
is merely a means of insuring the right to be tried by an "impartial jury." 
The decision of the Holland court is both wrong and dangerous for 
two reasons.30 First, by separating the "fair-cross-section" requirement 
from the "impartial jury" requirement of the Sixth Amendment, the Court 
has created a false dichotomy: "the fair-cross-section requirement either 
protects impartiality or guarantees a petit jury that mirrors the community 
from which it is drawn.,,3) As Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, 
these two concepts are not in conflict - the right to be tried by an im-
partial jury and the right to be tried by a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity are both found in the Constitution. In fact, the very concept of a 
"jury" assumes a cross-section of the community: "the fair-cross-section 
requirement is not based on the constitutional demand for impartiality; it 
is founded on the notion that what is denominated a 'jury' is not a 'jury' 
in the eyes of the Constitution unless it is drawn from a fair cross section 
of the community.,,32 
28. 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
29. [d. at 480. 
30. The decision in Holland seems odd given the Court's recent posture on the 
Sixth Amendment and jury selection. For example, in Frank Dean Teague v. Lane, 
109 S. Ct. 1060, 1065 (1989), a habeas corpus petitioner argued that the fair-cross-
section requirement precluded a prosecutor from exercising race-based peremptory 
challenges. The Court held that a favorable resolution of the collateral claim would 
not benefit the defendant because his conviction was final at the time of the Court's 
decision. However, the Court retreated from the notion that the fair-cross-section re-
quirement does not extend to petit juries: "The Court's characterization of the 
petitioner's fair-cross-section claim as 'requiring fair and reasonable proportional repre-
sentation on the petit jury' was remarkable." Alschuler, supra note I, at 185 n.l28. 
31. Holland, 493 U.S. at 493 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
32. [d. Any other view is a dramatic shift from the long-held belief 
that the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn 
from a fair cross section of the community. A unanimous Court stated 
in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940), that "[ilt is part of the 
established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public jus-
tice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community." 
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527. 
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Furthermore, the fair-cross-section requirement serves a different role 
than the impartial-jury requirement.33 The fair-cross-section requirement 
exists to (1) guard against arbitrary exercises of power by "ensuring that 
the 'commonsense judgment of the community' will act as a 'hedge 
against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor"'; (2) to preserve public 
confidence in the system; and (3) to manifest public involvement in the 
administration of justice.34 
Second, the Holland decision is dangerous because the majority cre-
ates a license for bigotry in criminal trials. By suggesting that the fair-
cross-section requirement is inapplicable to the petit jury,35 the court 
intimates that the Sixth Amendment does not prevent the exclusion of 
cognizable groups during voir dire.36 Thus, except for the current (albeit 
narrow) limitations imposed via the Equal Protection Clause, there is no 
mechanism for preventing an attorney from excluding African-Americans 
because "they are all criminals," or Jews because "they are all stingy 
liberals," or women because "they are all too emotional and generally 
unintelligent." As long as the jury that decided the case appears "impar-
tial," there is no limit to the bigotry an attorney can employ to exclude 
individuals from jury service merely because they are members of a 
disfavored group. 
The Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section guarantee should extend to 
the composition of the petit jury. Just because a defendant does not have 
an absolute right to be tried by a mathematically exact "fair cross-sec-
tion" does not mean the "Sixth Amendment has no implications for the 
process of selecting the petit jury from the venire.'037 If the fair-cross-
33. Obviously, the impartial-jury requirement promotes the goal of insuring that the 
decision is based on the evidence presented and the correct application of the law, 
and not juror bias. 
34. Holland, 493 U.S. at 495 (citing Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174-75 (quoting Taylor, 
419 U.S. at 530-31). 
35. [d. at 483. 
36. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia argued: 
But to say that the Sixth Amendment deprives the State of the ability 
to "stack the deck" in its favor is not to say that each side may not, 
once a fair hand is dealt, use peremptory challenges to eliminate pro-
spective jurors belonging to groups it believes would unduly favor the 
other side." 
Holland, 493 U.S. at 481. Ostensibly the "fair hand" to which Justice Scalia alludes 
is the venire. But the Justice obviously does not play cards often, otherwise he would 
not be so quick to assume that the hand a person initially is dealt is a "fair hand," 
nor would he be likely to tolerate a game that arbitrarily excluded every black card 
and every queen from play. Who would want to play by those rules? 
37. Michael McCray v. Robert Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1128 (2d Cir. 1984), vacat-
ed, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Batson, 476 U.S. 
162 (1986» (reaffirmed in Michael Roman v. Robert Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 
1987», cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989). 
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section requirement applies only to the selection of the venire, the Sixth 
Amendment is meaningless, because "[n]o defendant has ever been tried 
before a venire.,,38 
Holland aside, the Supreme Court has laid the foundation to support 
the position that the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants an opportu-
nity for a petit jury that is representative of the community. In Ballew v. 
Georgia,39 the Court held that while the composition of the venire was 
fine, a five-person jury was insufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment 
cross-section requirement. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,40 the Supreme 
Court overturned a statute that allowed the state to challenge for cause 
any member of the venire who opposed the death penalty because these 
challenges would tamper with the fair composition of the petit jury. 
The argument for extending the fair-cross-section requirement to the 
petit jury has also found sympathetic ears at the circuit court level. Both 
the Second and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted the view 
that the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement extends to petit 
juries. For example, in Roman v. Abrams,41 the Second Circuit, while 
reversing the grant of a habeas corpus petition, upheld the application of 
the fair-cross-section doctrine to petit juries: 
[A]lthough the Sixth Amendment does not give the defendant the 
right to a petit jury of any particular composition, . . . it does 
protect him against the state's discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges in such a way as to eliminate even the possibility that 
the petit jury could reflect a cross-section of the community.42 
In Booker v. Jabe,43 the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court's con-
viction of an African-American man because African-Americans were 
excluded from the petit jury based solely on their race. The Booker court 
applied a Sixth Amendment analysis and concluded that a "criminal 
charge will not be tried before a jury that fails to represent a cross-sec-
tion of the community as a consequence of a method of jury selection 
that systematically excludes a cognizable group from jury service.,,44 
Ballew, Witherspoon, Roman, and Booker demonstrate that the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment apply to the selection of the petit 
38. [d. 
39. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
40. 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (not overruled by Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), 
as indicated in LEXIS). 
41. Roman, 822 F.2d at 214, 216 (1989). 
42. [d. at 224-25. 
43. 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Larry Booker, 478 
U.S. 1001, reinstated on remand sub nom. Larry Booker v. John Jabe, 801 F.2d 871 
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987). 
44. [d. at 770. 
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Thus, because the focus of the Sixth Amendment should be broadened,s3 
so should the test that is used in applying it. 
The third prong is similarly flawed because it requires the defendant 
to prove systematic exclusion through a pattern of bigotry: a defendant 
must show that his or her case is one in a series of instances of 
discrimination. 54 However, the Sixth Amendment should attach every 
time a group is excluded from a particular jury: 
The Sixth Amendment provides that the right of the accused to 
trial by an impartial jury shall exist in "all criminal prosecutions." 
Thus, that Amendment protects each defendant who is to stand 
trial, not simply the last in a sequence of defendants to suffer the 
deprivation of an impartial jury. Accordingly, we construe the 
Sixth Amendment's provision to require the court to decide each 
case on the basis of the acts or practices complained of in that 
very case. 55 
Furthermore, one function of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-sec-
tion requirement is to protect the accused from an "overzealous or mis-
taken" prosecutor. It would be ironic if that very same prosecutor had the 
power arbitrarily to excuse whole segments of the population from jury 
service solely because of their gender. 56 If such were the case, the jury's 
ability to act as a check on the prosecutor would be greatly reduced or 
even neutralized. 
An excellent alternative to the outdated Duren test is the test devised 
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Booker v. Jabe.57 The court 
held that in order for a defendant to establish a prima facie case that a 
prosecutor has violated the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section require-
ment, the defendant must demonstrate that: 
(1) the group alleged to be excluded is a cognizable group in the 
community, and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the chal-
lenges leading to this exclusion have been made on the basis of 
the individual venirepersons' group affiliation rather than because 
of any indication of a possible inability to decide the case on the 
basis of the evidence presented. 58 
53. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
54. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 367. 
55. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1130 (first emphasis added and second emphasis in origi-
nal). See also Booker, 775 F.2d at 771-72. 
56. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. 
57. 775 F.2d 762 (see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text). While the case 
specifically involved racial discrimination, the test was suffIciently broad to encompass 
gender-based challenges. 
58. [d. at 773 (quoting McCray, 750 F.2d at 1131-32). 
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jury and that these protections are irreconcilable with a narrow applica-
tion of the Sixth Amendment.4s Eliminating the opportunity for a cogni-
zable group to participate on a petit jury strikes at the heart of Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee of a fair cross-section. The law should hold that 
"whatever the stage of the selection process, ... the state is not permit-
ted to restrict unreasonably the possibility that the petit jury will comprise 
a fair cross-section of the community.'>46 
Although there are no Supreme Court cases dealing with gender 
discrimination at the petit jury level, the Court has held that women 
cannot be excluded from other areas of the jury-selection process. For 
example, in Taylor v. Louisiana47 the Supreme Court struck down a ju-
ry-selection system whereby women could be selected for jury service 
only if they submitted a written declaration of their desire to serve. The 
Court held this practice to be a violation of the Sixth Amendment.48 
In Duren v. Missouri,49 the Supreme Court struck down a Missouri 
statute granting an automatic exemption from the venire to any woman 
who requested one.so The defendant appealed his conviction on the 
grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial had been violated 
because the statute caused women to be dramatically under-represented on 
jury venires.51 In striking down the statute, the Duren court fashioned a 
test to evaluate Sixth Amendment claims of unrepresentative juries: 
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be ex-
cluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the rep-
resentation of this group in venires from which juries are selected 
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such per-
sons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is 
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection pro-
cess.52 
The Duren test should not be applied, however, in assessing Sixth 
Amendment claims of outright gender discrimination because the second 
and third prongs are incompatible with the fair-cross-section requirement. 
Prong two is faulty because it relies on the narrow view that the Sixth 
Amendment protects only the source from which petit juries are drawn. 
45. See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1129. 
46. [d. 
47. 419 U.S. 522 (1986). 
48. [d. at 531. 
49. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
50. [d. at 360. 
51. [d. at 362. 
52. [d. at 364 (emphasis added). 
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Once a prima facie case of systematic exclusion has been established, 
the non-moving party would assume the burden of proof to justify the 
peremptory challenge(s) with a group-neutral explanation. 59 If the prose-
cutor fails to rebut the claim that jurors were peremptorily struck because 
of their group membership, the judge should declare a mistrial.60 
The Booker test is readily adaptable to gender claims. First, there can 
be no doubt that both men and women are cognizable groupS.6J Second, 
the fact that a peremptory challenge is based on an individual's gender 
affiliation, rather than the individual's capacity to serve as a fair and 
impartial juror, can easily be established. For example, it has long been 
recognized that women are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men 
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement.62 In 
Anaya v. Hansen,63 the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that women 
share common attitudes, experiences, and goals like a cognizable group. 
The court concluded that women were sufficiently distinct from men to 
qualify them as a cognizable group.64 
Therefore, gender-based peremptory challenges violate the Sixth 
Amendment because they are, by definition, exclusions based on cogni-
zable group affiliation rather than on an individual's ability to serve 
impartially.65 Yet most gender-based peremptory challenges are based on 
the erroneous assumption that women are less qualified than men to serve 
on juries. However, "[iJf it were ever the case that women were unquali-
fied to sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be re-
quired to perform jury service, that time has long since passed.,,66 
It is sad that many lawyers still cling to stereotypes to explain what 
they do not understand. Closed minds rely on easy explanations that have 
no basis in fact to explain the voting behavior of jurors. Sexist jury-selec-
59. [d. 
60. [d. 
61. James Barber v. Joseph Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), 
held that three elements are required to establish the existence of a cognizable group: 
(1) the group must be clearly identifiable; (2) the group must share common attitudes 
or experiences; and (3) there must be a community of interest among the members of 
the group. 
62. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531. See also United States v. 
Diane Carol Canfield, 879 F.2d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1989); Samuel Gibson III v. Wal-
ter Zant, 705 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983); David S. Sands v. Michael J. 
Cunningham, 617 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (D.C.N.H. 1985). 
63. See Linda Anaya v. Edward 1. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (cogni-
zable groups are limited to groups subject to discrimination in the community), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986) (citing Barber, 772 F.2d at 999). 
64. [d. 
65. The key here is that an attorney must connect the reason for a peremptory 
challenge with a quality necessary for a juror to evaluate the evidence fairly and 
intelligently. 
66. Taylor, 429 U.S. at 534-35 (footnote omitted). 
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tion manuals and "lawyer lore" provide ample evidence of the stereotyp-
ing that women must endure. For example, women are labeled by many 
lawyers and judges as being "emotional, submissive, envious, and pas-
sive. ,,67 One author noted that 
hell may have no fury like a woman juror who is to decide the 
case of a young and attractive woman. The juror in such cases is 
apt to be a severe critic of the dress, speech, and deportment of 
the female plaintiff. The merits of the case may only be inciden-
tal. 68 
Another author found equally illegitimate reasons for wanting to keep 
women on a jury: 
Women jurors are desirable if the defendant happens to be a 
handsome young man .... Women are desirable if the principal 
witness against the defendant is a woman. Women are somewhat 
distrustful of other women .... The occupation of a woman's 
husband is important, too, for generally, she will feel and think in 
the same manner as her husband.69 
Finally, the focus should not be on whether a jury has any women on 
it. Even if some women are on a petit jury, the Sixth Amendment may 
still be violated because the process allowed for the exclusion of some 
women who might have remained on the jury had they been men. The 
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is not to insure that a certain demo-
graphic make-up is maintained. Rather, the purpose is to insure that the 
process is designed to allow what would normally occur through random 
chance. Only then is the fair-cross-section requirement satisfied. 
Some might argue that modem jury selection requires the use of 
communication theory or psychological profiling. 70 Such approaches 
67. Susan L. McCoin, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire Process: The Rights of 
Prospective Female Jurors, 58 So. CAL. L. REv. 1225, 1244 (1985) (quoting Nemith, 
Endicott & Watchler, From the '50s to the '70s: Women in Jury Deliberations, 39 
SOCIOMETRY 293, 294 (1976». 
68. Joseph Kelner, Jury Selection: The Prejudice Syndrome, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. at 36 
(Feb. 1984). Other authors have asserted similar notions in civil cases. Heal noted: 
I find that women on juries are extremely intolerant as to the com-
plaints of their own sex. When a woman plaintiff starts talking about 
backaches and headaches to another group of women, she is talking 
about ailments which most of the other women have had, and the 
other women have never been paid for these headaches. 
Clarence W. Heal, Selection of the Jury, 40 ILL. B.J. 328, 340 (1952). However, civil 
trials are outside the scope of this article. 
69. Henry B. Rosenblatt, Techniques for Jury Selection, 2 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 18 
(May 1986). 
70. HARRy KALVEN AND HANs ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); K.P. Taylor 
and J. Wright, Review of Research on Jury Selection and Jury Behavior, in COMMU-
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entail identifying several special "indicators" of potential juror behavior. 
These "indicators," in tum, provide the basis for peremptorily challenging 
certain jurors. The pitfall of this approach is that flawed or misapplied 
profiling techniques could result in eliminating an entire class Or group 
from the final jury panel.7I For example, one study asserted that "men 
traditionally favor the prosecution and that women are more likely to be 
egalitarian. ,,72 
Although no study has ever proven that a lawyer's use of the pe-
remptory challenge has influenced the jury, the discriminatory use of 
peremptories can result in impaneling a petit jury that the defendant 
and/or the community perceives as biased.73 Even if there were some 
empirical data from which lawyers could make accurate inferences about 
women, those inferences cannot be allowed to supersede the constitutional 
rights guaranteed to criminal defendants. 
The lack of women on juries is a symptom of a deeper problem. The 
problem is that the jury-selection process allows for manipUlation based 
on characteristics that are group-based, not individually based. The pe-
remptory challenge has been corrupted. It is no longer just a tool for 
eliminating specific bias. It is now a tool used to promote bigotry and sex 
discrimination in jury selection. 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The United States Constitution grants to all persons the equal protec-
tion of the laws.74 In Craig v. Boren,75 the Supreme Court established 
a standard of review for gender discrimination under the Equal Protection 
NICATION STRATEGIES IN THE PRACTICE OF LAWYERING 206 (Ronald J. Matlon and 
Richard J. Crawford eds., 1983). But see David Silver, The Case Against the Use of 
Public Opinion Polls as an Aid in Jury Selection, 6 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 
177 (1978). 
71. See Jeffrey T. Fredrick, Jury Behavior: A Psychologist Examines Jury Selection, 
5 Omo N.U. L. REv. 571, 575-76 (1978). 
72. Michael Fried, Kalman J. Kaplan & Katherine W. Klein, Jury Selection: An 
Analysis of Voir Dire, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 52 (Rita James Simon ed., 
1975). 
73. Massaro, supra note 2, at 525. 
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
75. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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Clause. The Court decided that to withstand an equal protection chal-
lenge, gender classifications must be capable of surviving "intermediate 
scrutiny" - the classification must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives.76 The bottom line is that gender classifications are unconstitutional 
unless they substantially relate to an important governmental end.77 
There have been many court battles fought over the extent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of women against discriminatory 
practices. To date there are no Supreme Court cases that squarely address 
the issue of equal protection and the use of peremptory challenges to ex-
clude women from jury panels.78 There are, however, clear precedents 
that hold that the exclusion of African-Americans from petit juries solely 
on the basis of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
In Batson v. Kentucky,79 the most recent case to come before the 
Court on this issue, the defendant was tried and convicted of burglary by 
an all-white jury in state court. During voir dire, the prosecution exer-
cised its peremptory challenges to strike all four African-Americans from 
the jury panel. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury on the 
grounds of discrimination in jury selection. The trial court denied the 
motion, and Batson appealed. 
On review, the state relied on Swain v. Alabama,80 the landmark 
case that established that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the 
use of race as a criterion in any particular case. Rather, a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation must be proved by demonstrating a pattern of ex-
clusions in "case after case.,,81 Batson expressly rejected the Swain test, 
pointing out that the "case-after-case method" did almost nothing to pre-
vent discrimination by the state at the petit jury stage.82 As a result, the 
Batson court embraced a different standard: it required only that the 
defendant demonstrate that a peremptory challenge was used to discrimi-
nate racially against a specific potential juror at the defendant's trial.83 
One justification of the Batson decision was that it was a response to 
the history of discrimination against African-Americans in the arena of 
76. [d. at 197. 
77. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Joe Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (extending 
heightened scrutiny to a public university that excluded men). 
78. McCoin, supra note 67, at 1230. 
79. 476 U.S. 79 (1989). 
80. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
81. [d. at 223. 
82. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. 
83. [d. at 95. 
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jury service.84 But women have an equally long history of being dis-
criminated against,8S especially in the area of jury selection. 
For example, in 1879 the Supreme Court ruled in Strauder v. West 
Virginia that the exclusion of African-Americans from juries was a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.86 Although Strauder was a mam-
moth step for the equality of African-Americans, it was no step at all for 
women. In dictum the Strauder court proclaimed that while African-
Americans were protected against racial discrimination, the state was free 
to "confine the [jury] selection to males.,,87 It was not until 1975, more 
than seventy-five years later, that the Supreme Court rejected the notion 
that the state could bar women from jury service.88 
It should be apparent by now that in the area of jury selection the 
history of discrimination against women is at least as bad as the discrim-
ination against African-Americans.89 Therefore, there is no reason why 
the court should continue to ignore the long history of gender discrimina-
tion in the selection of jurors after it emphatically rejected racial discrimi-
nation in the same area. 
Another basis of the Batson decision was the recognition that the 
Equal Protection Clause limits the use of peremptory challenges for trial-
related reasons.90 Yet it is impossible to accept the proposition that 
Batson does not have any implications for women without implying that 
the Equal Protection Clause is not a prophylactic against gender discrimi-
nation. Even Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Batson conceded that wom-
en would be entitled to the same protections as African-Americans under 
the majority's application of the Equal Protection Clause.91 
Therefore, it is logical to conclude that "equal protection of the laws" 
in the area of jury selection does not end at racial considerations. Al-
though Batson does not express an opinion about invidious discrimination 
84. See Oliviera, 534 A.2d at 870 (Batson did not cover a male juror because 
there was no history of discrimination against men). 
85. See Sharron A. Frontiero v. Elliot L. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). 
86. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (overruled by Taylor, 419 U.S. 522). 
87. [d. 
88. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537. 
89. I do not intend to trivialize the oppression of African-Americans. However, in 
the area of jury selection, women have suffered longer and in much subtler ways 
than any other group in American society. It is often the invisible tyrannies that have 
the most impact. When the system covertly oppresses its citizens, they must first 
realize their subjugation and then exhaust years persuading those not directly affected 
that they are indeed being oppressed. Only then can they attempt to solve the prob-
lem. 
90. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. 
91. [d. at 124 (Burger, C.l., dissenting) ("[Ilf conventional equal protection princi-
ples apply, then presumably defendants could object to exclusions on the basis of not 
only race, but also sex"). 
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against women during jury selection, the Batson rationale can easily be 
extended to protect everyone against gender discrimination. Therefore, 
Batson should be extended to protect women from the same type of 
discrimination that the court has so quickly condemned on racial grounds. 
Once the Court has accepted that the Equal Protection Clause imposes a 
limit on peremptory challenges, justifying juror strikes because an attor-
ney is prejudiced against women should be neither tolerated nor con-
doned.92 
One final question arises: What level of scrutiny should the court 
apply? The Court has traditionally used the strict scrutiny standard when 
testing racial classifications for possible Equal Protection Clause viola-
tions and intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications.93 In Batson, 
however, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny. Instead, it fashioned a 
new standard for reviewing peremptory challenges: they must be indepen-
dent of the juror's membership in a protected class.94 Thus, the burden 
falls on the challenger to provide a race-neutral explanation of each sus-
pect strike. 
If the Batson level of scrutiny were applied to sex discrimination, the 
state would be blocked by the Fourteenth Amendment from attempting to 
strike potential jurors merely because they are women. But even if Batson 
is inapplicable to gender, the use of gender-based peremptory challenges 
would still fail the traditional intermediate scrutiny test because the state 
would be hard-pressed to show that the exclusion of anyone on the basis 
of gender was substantially related to an important governmental inter-
est.95 
The only valid96 justification for a gender-based peremptory chal-
lenge is that women are unable to serve as fair and impartial jurors in a 
particular case. Such "romantic paternalism" is manifested in "gross, 
92. Alschuler. supra note 1. at 182. 
93. See Cherlyn Clark v. Gene Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910. 1914 (1988). 
94. See Batson. 476 U.S. at 97 (explicitly relating only to racial classifications). See 
also People v. David Irazarry. 536 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (applying 
Batson to gender). 
95. See Hogan. 458 U.S. at 723-24 and n.9; Boren. 429 U.S. at 197. Even the 
diluted "similarly situated" test established in Michael M. v. Superior Court. 450 U.S. 
464 (1981). would not justify gender discrimination in jury selection. In Michael M .• 
the Court upheld a statutory rape scheme that punished only males. [d. at 466. The 
Court upheld the statute because men and women were not "similarly situated" -
women can get pregnant and men cannot. [d. at 471-72. Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
"logic." however, does not extend to gender discrimination in jury selection because 
men and women are always similarly situated in the context of a jury - both are 
equally capable of being fair and impartial. 
96. I use the term "valid" within the confines of the preceding discussion of per-
missible Fourteenth Amendment activities. 
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stereotyped distinctions between the sexes" that have no basis in fact. 97 
This kind of reasoning has been used to justify the exclusion of women 
from running for office, owning property, serving as legal guardians for 
their own children, having standing to bring a suit in their own names, 
and serving on juries.98 
The Boren court emphatically rejected such gender stereotyping as 
"loose-fitting characterizations" that are false.99 "Jury competence is an 
individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very 
heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class 
distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic 
ideals of trial by jury.,,100 Thus, even if the Court were to find that the 
Batson test is not sufficient to evaluate gender-based challenges, the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard would suffice as a means of striking down gen-
der-based peremptory challenges. 
Some courts have seen fit to extend the Batson Equal Protection 
Clause analysis to stop discrimination. For example, the Ninth Circuit has 
recently held that equal protection principles prohibit prosecutors from 
striking jurors for gender-related reasons. In United States v. De Gross, 
an en bane court reversed the defendant'S conviction for aiding and abet-
ting in the illegal transportation of an alien. IOJ The court held that the 
conviction was invalid because the prosecutor's deliberate removal of 
women from the jury because of their gender was an illegitimate use of 
gender-based peremptory challenges. I02 The government argued that the 
strikes were an attempt to balance the jury, since the defendant was 
discriminatorily eliminating men.103 The court held, however, that such 
practice by the government was unconstitutional discrimination despite 
the nobility of the prosecutor's cause. 104 
The court in De Gross not only extended Batson to gender discrimi-
nation but also prohibited the use of discriminatory challenges by a crimi-
nal defendant. Previously, only prosecutors were prohibited from this 
practice. The De Gross court held that criminal defendants are also for-
bidden under the Equal Protection Clause from exercising sexually dis-
criminatory peremptory challenge. lOS The court extended the prohibition 
97. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85. 
98. Id. at 685. 
99. Boren, 429 U.S. at 199. 
100. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (quoting Theil, 328 U.S. at 
220). 
lOt. United States v. Juana Espericueta De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
102. Id. at 1439. 
103. Id. at 1443. 
104. Id. at 1442-43. 
105. Id. at 1441. 
1m & 
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on discriminatory challenges to defendants because the jury-selection 
process "represents a unique governmental function." A criminal 
defendant's discrimination thus results in the sort of illegitimate state 
action that the Equal Protection Clause exists to prevent. 106 
Some courts, however, have taken the position that Batson should not 
be extended to gender discrimination. For example, in United States v. 
Hamilton lO7 an African-American defendant established a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination in the government's use of peremptory chal-
lenges. The government rebutted the claim by demonstrating that the 
excused jurors were all women and that it exercised the challenges be-
cause it "wanted more men on the jury."I08 The Fourth Circuit accepted 
this explanation, rejecting the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause 
compelled the application of Batson to peremptory challenges on the 
basis of gender.109 The only reason the Hamilton court gave for re-
jecting the extension of Batson to gender was that the Supreme Court had 
not done so itself. 110 
Hamilton adds nothing new to the substantive debate on this issue. 
There is no principled justification for the court's conclusion; the Hamil-
ton court used the Supreme Court's sidestepping of the gender issue in 
Batson as a rationale for its own inaction. It is irrational to claim that 
because something has not happened, it ought not to happen. III The 
Hamilton court had a unique opportunity to fill the void where no prece-
dent existed; instead, it abdicated its responsibility by ratifying the status 
quo. 
It is no surprise that the Batson court did not decide the gender issue, 
since gender was not an issue on appeal. The Supreme Court generally 
avoids answering a question broader than the one before it, and it avoids 
anticipating a constitutional question before it must decide it. 112 The 
106. See id. at 1441 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 
2086 (1991). In Edmonson, the Court held that civil litigants' use of peremptory 
challenges is subject to constitutional scrutiny because, though not exercised by the 
government, it is tantamount to state action. Id. at 2084. Since Edmonson, the Su-
preme Court has specifically applied the state action doctrine to criminal defendants. 
See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defendants 
from purposefully discriminating on the basis of race in exercising their peremptory 
challenges). 
107. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988). 
108. Id. at 1041. 
109. Id. at 1042. 
110. Id. 
111. This is commonly referred to as the "is/ought fallacy." This same uncreative 
thinking was used to rationalize slavery in the first half of our country's history: 
"There is slavery; therefore, there ought to be slavery." 
112. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985); Ashwander v. 
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
, m 
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Court did not need to fashion a rule preventing gender-based peremptory 
challenges when Batson involved only race discrimination. 
There are also several state court opinions that have concluded that 
Batson should not be extended. Most rely on the same unprincipled foun-
dation articulated in Hamilton. 113 
The only "non-Hamilton" argument is that "if the use of gender as a 
criterion for exercising peremptory challenges is prohibited, all such 
challenges will become inherently sUSpeCt.,,114 This "administrative 
nightmare" theory is empirically false. If the argument were true, appel-
late courts would have been deluged shortly after the Batson decision: 
every peremptory challenge would have been questioned on racial 
grounds. But this did not happen. Therefore, there is no reason to sub-
ordinate the Constitution. Our fundamental rights should never be sacri-
ficed on the altar of administrative efficiency. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that sex discrimination injures 
not only the defendant but also the juror,115 the judicial system, and so-
ciety.116 In Taylor v. Louisiana ll7 the Court recognized that the jury 
is a vehicle for public justice and that using the jury system to exclude 
particular groups is repugnant to egalitarian principles.118 How can the 
public have faith in a jury system that tolerates systematic discrimination 
based on stereotypes and ignorance? The current tolerance of discrimina-
tion is simply a signal that the courts are ambivalent about the equality of 
the individual. This discrimination not only frustrates those seeking jus-
tice before the bar, but also undermines the public's trust in the system. 
By expanding the Equal Protection Clause to gender-based perempto-
ry challenges, the Court would send the unmistakably correct message 
that everyone truly is equal under the law. 
113. See, e.g., State v. Lorie A. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (1989); Belinda C. Hannan 
v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Salt Lake County v. Linda 
J. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Sandra Adams, 533 So. 2d 
1060 (La. App. Ct. 1988), cert. denied, 540 So. 2d (La. 1989). 
114. Oliviera, 534 A.2d at 870 (emphasis in original). 
115. Although invidious discrimination against potential jurors is not the topic of this 
article, it deserves at least a mention. In Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 
(1970), the Supreme Court stated that potential jurors who are systematically excluded 
from service may seek judicial relief: "Defendants in criminal proceedings do not 
have the only cognizable legal interest in non-discriminatory jury selection." [d. at 
329. The Court equated the injury to the potential juror with that of the defendant. 
There is no legitimate reason why this rationale should not apply to gender. 
116. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195 (injury from "[t]he systematic and intentional exclu-
sion of women [from petit juries] ... is not limited to the defendant - there is an 
injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and 
to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts"). 
117. 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). 
118. See McCoin, supra note 67, at 1241. 
,~: "",,,-
:£ 
128 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:1 
CREATIVE ALTERNATIVES 
One solution to the whole problem of bigotry in the jury-selection 
process is to abolish the peremptory challenge. As Justice Marshall noted 
in his concurrence in Batson, the only way to eliminate the problem of 
racially motivated jury strikes is to eliminate the peremptory chal-
lenge."9 Only then will there be no chance of discrimination in voir 
dire. The same logic holds true for gender-based strikes: If there are no 
peremptory challenges, then there will be no gender-based strikes. 
However, the peremptory challenge does serve an important function. 
It protects the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury trial. 12O It 
would be intolerable for an African-American or a Jewish defendant to be 
prohibited from striking a potential juror who is editor of "White Power" 
magazine. 
A better solution is to eliminate only the state's right to exercise 
peremptory challenges. The following model rule of criminal procedure is 
offered as an alternative to the current regime. 
MODEL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
FOR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES121 
(a) The exercise of a peremptory challenge by the govern-
ment is not allowed. However, a defendant has the right to exer-
cise peremptory challenges as long as they are not directed 
against a cognizable group. 
(b) A cognizable group is one that is (1) clearly identifiable 
and (2) composed of individuals who share common attitudes or 
experiences. Groups classified according to race, color, national 
origin, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, handicap, disability, sexual 
orientation, and alienage are examples of cognizable groups. 
(c) Cognizable-group peremptory challenges are per se dis-
crimination, and upon timely motion by the government the se-
lected juror(s) shall either be dismissed, or, at the discretion of 
the trial court, the removed juror(s) shall be impaneled. The mo-
tion shall (1) establish by a pattern of challenges and facts a 
prima facie case that one or more venirepersons were removed as 
potential jurors because of their membership in a cognizable 
119. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, I., concurring) (eliminating peremptory 
challenges would eliminate racial discrimination). 
120. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text 
121. This model rule modifies Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. The model rule itself was adapted from another model rule proposed by Susan 
L. McCoin. See McCoin, supra note 67, at 1257. 
'Q 
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group and (2) contain the record and affidavits in support of the 
charge. 
(d) A record of the exercise of the challenges shall be made 
by the court clerk. 
(e) If the presiding judge denies the motion, the movant may 
petition for a writ of mandamus with the clerk of the court of ap-
peals. 122 
129 
The model rule not only embraces the ideals embodied in the 
Batson123 and Bookerl24 tests, it also extends their underlying as-
sumptions to their ultimate conclusion - that the Constitution commands 
the eradication of bigotry in jury selection. While the existence of pe-
remptory challenges will always leave open the possibility of abuses on 
the part of the defendant, there are ways to reduce the potential for gen-
der-based discrimination. First, the model rule provides a vehicle for 
preventing at least some defense against bigotry. Second, a defendant's 
regard for the composition of the jury is much more important than the 
state's. The potential impact on a defendant's life or liberty justifies the 
adage that "it is better to set a guilty person free than to convict an inno-
cent one." A defendant has only one day in court; the state has many. 
There is still the possibility that an all-male or an all-female jury 
could occur by chance. If the government is concerned that a single-gen-
der jury might be impaneled, or that a defendant might use peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory manner, then the government need only 
insist that jury venires be sufficiently representative of both sexes, thereby 
rendering the defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges 
ineffectual. 125 
Some might contend that eliminating the state's right to peremptory 
challenges would put it at a disadvantage compared to the defense. How-
ever, this assumes that the state and the defendant are on equal ground 
from the outset. One can hardly compare the awesome power of govern-
ment against the procedural and substantive rights of the individual. Gov-
ernments have the power to fine, confine, and even kill. There has never 
been parity between the accused and the state. Perhaps if we do not allow 
the state to eliminate individuals from jury duty by virtue of gender, we 
can begin to redress the sexual discrimination that pervades our legal 
system. 
122. Adapted from Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
123. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
125. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 560-61 (applying the same analysis to all cogni-
zable groups) . 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Abolishing the state's peremptory challenges offends no constitutional 
interest, nor does it threaten any state interest, by eliminating jurors inca-
pable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict. The prosecutor may still 
challenge jurors for cause. And if a prosecutor can articulate a reason 
why a particular juror would not be fair or impartial, then that juror can 
be removed. 
Discrimination is intolerable. When attorneys use jury selection to 
impose their myopia on the community, the response should be to take 
away the tools they are using to discriminate. Gender-based peremptory 
challenges are used by lawyers to justify their bias against women. If this 
article does nothing else, I hope it will cause those oblivious to gender 
discrimination in the legal community to wake up! 
1\1 
